Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination is but icing on unconscious machinations), but as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has recently noted, is a radical new epistemology and the foundation for all (...) description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes, and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of W's work and all useful discussion of behavior is a development of or variation on these ideas. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding (...) Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life (no I am not joking!). However (in my view) like all analysis of W, they fall far short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advance in describing behavior, suffering from the near universal tunnel vision and failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal form here. After doing this I will give brief comments on each article in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2016). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having (...) a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., human ecology and psychology) in school, maybe civilization would have a chance. -/- In my view these articles and reviews have many novel and highly useful elements, in that they use my own version of the recently (ca. 1980’s) developed dual systems view of our brain and behavior to lay out a logical system of rationality (personality, psychology, mind, language, behavior, thought, reasoning, reality etc.) that is sorely lacking in the behavioral sciences (psychology, philosophy, literature, politics, anthropology, history, economics, sociology etc.). The philosophy centers around the two writers I have found the most important, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. -/- Now that I think I understand how the games work I have mostly lost interest in philosophy, which of course is how Wittgenstein said it should be. But since they are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put, it due to the lack of perspicuity of language, the problems run throughout all human discourse, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning principally with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. -/- "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) -/- Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how our psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of the 21st century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (hereafter DMS),but also to many others, some of the more prominent of whom I mention in the articles. -/- When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in an Amazon review as the Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document for understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles noting that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we can know anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what is now characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I generated a dual systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very powerful in describing behavior. I took the small table that John Searle (hereafter S) had been using, expanded it greatly, and found later that it integrated perfectly with the framework being used by various current workers in thinking and reasoning research. -/- Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews and articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the repetition of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with a short article that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its terminology and background. Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts a survey of the work of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an understanding or description (not explanation as W insisted) of behavior. -/- The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides Standard Social Science Model. Democracy and equality are wonderful ideals, but without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation and any world that adopts them. The monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we sell our children’s heritage for temporary comforts. -/- The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the thoughts of System 1) must lead directly to actions. It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves an heuristic for how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it,includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. -/- Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth. -/- My writings are available in updated versions as paperbacks and Kindles on Amazon. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) 2nd printing with corrections (Feb 2018) ASIN B0711R5LGX -/- Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) ASIN B07CQVWV9C . (shrink)

Como tantas veces en filosofía, el título no sólo establece la línea de batalla, sino que expone los prejuicios y errores del autor, ya que si podemos o no dar sentido al juego de idiomas 'Ver las cosas como son' y si es posible tener una 'teoría filosófica' de percepción' (que sólo puede ser sobre cómo funciona el lenguaje de la percepción), a diferencia de uno científico, que es una teoría sobre cómo funciona el cerebro, son exactamente los problemas. Este (...) es el Clásico Searle, excelente y probablemente al menos tan bueno como cualquier otro puede producir, pero carente de una comprensión completa de las ideas fundamentales del Wittgenstein posterior y sin comprender los dos sistemas de marco de pensamiento, lo que podría haberlo hecho brillante. Al igual que en su trabajo anterior, Searle evita en gran medida la ciencia, pero hay lapsos frecuentes y no entiende que los problemas son siempre sobre los juegos de idiomas, un fracaso que comparte con casi todo el mundo. Después de proporcionar un marco que consiste en una Tabla de Intencionalidad basada en los dos sistemas de pensamiento y pensamiento y investigación de decisiones, doy un análisis detallado del libro. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019), Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política , Economía, Hitoria y Literatura (2020) y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky (2019) y otras. Al igual que con Wittgenstein (en adelante W), todo lo que Searle (en adelante S) escribe es un tesoro y es maravilloso que permanezca afilado a medida que se acerca a los 80. A diferencia de la mayoría, incluso sus primeros trabajos siguen siendo relevantes y está trabajando en varios otros libros. También sugiero sus más de 100 conferencias y entrevistas en youtube, vimeo, etc., que, aunque inevitablemente un poco repetitivas, contienen muchas declaraciones que no están en sus escritos. He leído casi toda su obra, y he escuchado todas las conferencias, la mayoría de ellas 2 o 3 veces. Estos son de especial interés como (como Wittgenstein) que no lee de las notas, por lo que cada uno es único y no una réplica de un papel, y es un excelente orador extemporáneo que en su mayoría utiliza un lenguaje sin pretensiones (ambos tan diferentes de la mayoría de los demás). Las conferencias recientes dadas en las Universidades Europeas son magníficas, pero no te pierdas las antiguas como la conferencia de la BBC "Una realidad cambiante, la ciencia del comportamiento humano", que da un excelente relato de por qué la causalidad legítima y repetitiva del rápido cerebro sistema automático, no linguístico 1 (S1) es fundamentalmente diferente y no destacable de la misma manera que la complejidad ilimitada de razones que caracterizan el lento sistema deliberativo, consciente de la lengua 2 (S2), que genera una explosión combinatoria no generalmente representable de una manera útil por las leyes científicas. El sistema dual (S1, S2) método de describir el pensamiento utilizado en esta revisión, común a la investigación de razonamiento desde hace unos 20 años, es mío y no de Searle. Dado que recientemente he escrito un artículo de 75p analizando el trabajo de Searle en comparación con el de Wittgenstein (La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje como revelado por Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle) no lo repetiré y lo repetiré concentrarse en este libro solamente. (shrink)

Claramente nem eu nem ninguém jamais leremos qualquer parte substancial desta enorme tomada, então discutirei o único artigo que mais me interessa e que acho que fornece o quadro necessário para entender todos os outros. Estou falando de Ludwig Wittgenstein 'W. Mesmo que eu tentasse discutir os outros, eu não passaria a primeira página, pois todos os problemas aqui surgem imediatamente em qualquer discussão de comportamento. Diferenciação de pragmáticos e semântica não faz sentido em grande parte. É defensável que este (...) trabalho "Desenvolvimentos do contextualismo de Wittgenstein" possa ser legendado, mas é claro que este termo foi inevitavelmente corrompido pelos filósofos. Pode-se então dizer que pragmáticos e semânticas são partes ou coextensivo com epistemologia e ontologia e psicologia descritiva do pensamento de alta ordem (Estrutura Lógica da Racionalidade de Searle) ou que descrevem como usamos ruídos em contextos específicos para lhes dar significado - ou seja, uso verdadeiro ou falso (proposicional). A adição do trabalho de Wittgenstein/Searle à pesquisa de pensamento moderno fornece uma estrutura para pragmáticos, semânticas e todos os outros comportamentos humanos. Aqueles que querem uma estrutura completa até o momento para o comportamento humano do ponto de vista moderno de dois sistemas podem consultar meus livros Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicide Pela Democracy 4ª ed (2020), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections Between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics and Economics (2020), Illusaos Utopias Suicidas no século 21 6ª ed (2020), Observações sobre Impossibilidade, Incompletude, Paraconsistência, Indecidabilidade, Aleatoriedade, Computação, Paradoxo e Incerteza em Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock e Yanofsky (2019) e outros. (shrink)

Horwich gibt eine feine Analyse von Wittgenstein (W) und ist ein führender W-Stipendiat, aber meinerMeinung nach sind sie alle hinter einer vollen Wertschätzung zurück, wie ich in dieser Rezension und vielen anderen ausführlich erkläre. Wenn man W (und vorzugsweise auch Searle) nicht versteht, dann sehe ich nicht, wie man mehr als ein oberflächliches Verständnis von Philosophie und höherem Denken und damit von allem komplexen Verhalten (Psychologie, Soziologie, Anthropologie, Geschichte, Literatur, Gesellschaft) haben könnte. Kurz gesagt, W hat gezeigt, dass, wenn Sie (...) gezeigt haben, wie ein Satz im Zusammenhang mit Interesse verwendet wird, es nichts mehr zu sagen gibt. Ich beginne mit ein paar bemerkenswerten Zitaten und gebe dann, was ich denke, sind die minimalen Überlegungen notwendig, um Wittgenstein zu verstehen, Philosophie und menschliches Verhalten. Zunächst könnte man feststellen, dass es verdächtig sein sollte, "Meta" vor jedes Wort zu stellen. W bemerkte z.B., dass Metamathematik Mathematik wie jede andere ist. Die Vorstellung, dass wir aus der Philosophie austreten können (d.h. die beschreibende Psychologie des Denkens höherer Ordnung), ist selbst eine tiefe Verwirrung. Eine weitere Irritation hier (und während des akademischen Schreibens in den letzten 4 Jahrzehnten) ist der ständige umgekehrte sprachliche Sexismus von "ihrem" und "ihr" und "sie" oder "er/sie" usw., wo "sie" und "ihre" und "sie" gut machen würden. Ebenso, wird die Verwendung des französischen Wortes "Repertoire", bei dem das englische "Repertoire" recht gut funktioniert. Der größte Mangel ist das (wenn auch sehr häufige) völlige Versäumnis, das zu verwenden, was ich als die enorm leistungsfähige und intuitive Zwei-System-Ansicht von HOT und Searles Framework betrachte, die ich oben skizziert habe. Dies ist besonders ergreifend im Kapitel über die Bedeutung p111 ff. (besonders in den Fußnoten 2-7), wo wir in sehr schlammigem Wasser ohne den Rahmen von automatisierten echten nur S1, propositional DispositionS, COS usw. schwimmen. Man kann auch einen besseren Blick auf das Innere und das Äußere bekommen, indem man z.B. Johnston oder Budd liest (siehe meine Rezensionen). Horwich macht jedoch viele einschneidende Kommentare. Besonders gefiel mir seine Zusammenfassung der Bedeutung von Wes antitheoretischer Haltung auf P65. Er muss "On Certainty" stärker in den Vordergrund stellen, das kürzlich von Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva und anderen mit viel Aufwand beworfen und in meinen jüngsten Artikeln zusammengefasst wurde. Horwich ist erstklassig und seine Arbeit lohnt sich. Man hofft, dass er (und alle) Searle und einige moderne Psychologie sowie Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker und Baker etc. studieren werden, um eine breite moderne Sicht des Verhaltens zu erreichen. Die meisten ihrer Papiere sind auf academia dot edu und philpapers dot org, aber für PMS Hacker siehe http slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot html Er gibt eine der schönsten Zusammenfassungen, wo uns ein Verständnis von Wittgenstein hinterlässt, das ich je gesehen habe. "Es darf keinen Versuch geben, unsere sprachliche/konzeptionelle Tätigkeit (PI 126) zu erklären, wie in Freges Reduktion der Arithmetik auf logik; kein Versuch, ihr erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen zu geben (PI 124), wie sie auf der Grundlage von Berichten über ein vormethodikes Wissen beruhen; kein Versuch, idealisierte Formen davon (PI 130) als in gewissem Sinne Logiken zu charakterisieren; kein Reformversuch (PI 124, 132) wie in Mackies Fehlertheorie oder Dummetts Intuitionismus; kein Versuch, sie zu straffen (PI 133) wie in Quines Existenzbericht; kein Versuch, es konsistenter zu machen (PI 132) wie in Tarskis Antwort auf die Lügner-Paradoxien; und kein Versuch, es vollständiger zu machen (PI 133) wie bei der Klärung von Fragen der persönlichen Identität für bizarre hypothetische 'Teleportation'-Szenarien." Abschließend möchte ich vorschlagen, dass W mit der Perspektive, die ich hier gefördert habe, im Zentrum der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und Psychologie steht und nicht obskur, schwierig oder irrelevant ist, sondern schillernd, tiefgründig und kristallklar ist und dass es ist, eines der größten intellektuellen Abenteuer zu verpassen, das möglichist. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen . (shrink)

Horwich donne une belle analyse de Wittgenstein (W) et est un érudit W de premier plan, mais à mon avis, ils sont tous en deçà d’une pleine appréciation, comme je l’explique longuement dans cet examen et beaucoup d’autres. Si l’on ne comprend pas W (et de préférence Searle aussi) alors je ne vois pas comment on pourrait avoir plus qu’une compréhension superficielle de la philosophie et de la pensée de l’ordre supérieur et donc de tout comportement complexe (psychologie, sociologie, anthropologie, (...) histoire, littérature, société). En un mot, W a démontré que lorsque vous avez montré comment une phrase est utilisée dans le contexte d’intérêt, il n’y a rien de plus à dire. Je vais commencer par quelques citations notables, puis donner ce que je pense sont les considérations minimales nécessaires pour comprendre Wittgenstein, la philosophie et le comportement humain. Tout d’abord, on pourrait noter que mettre "meta" en face de n’importe quel mot devrait être suspect. W a fait remarquer par exemple, que la métamathématique est mathématiques comme les autres. L’idée que nous pouvons sortir de la philosophie (c’est-à-dire la psychologie descriptive de la pensée de haut ordre) est elle-même une profonde confusion. Une autre irritation ici (et tout au long de l’écriture académique pour les 4 dernières décennies) est le sexisme linguistique inverse constant de «elle» et «la sienne» et «elle» ou «il / elle», etc, où «ils» et «leur» et «eux» ferait bien. De même, l’utilisation du mot Français «répertoire» où le «répertoire» anglais se portera plutôt bien. La lacune majeure est l’échec complet (bien que très commun) d’employer ce que je considère comme la vue extrêmement puissante et intuitive de deux systèmes de HOT et Searle cadre que j’ai décrit ci-dessus. C’est particulièrement poignant dans le chapitre sur le sens p111 et seq. (en particulier dans les notes de bas de page 2-7), où nous nageons dans l’eau très boueuse sans le cadre de l’automatisé vrai seul S1, propositionnelle dispositionnelle S2, COS etc. On peut également avoir une meilleure vue de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur en lisant par exemple, Johnston ou Budd (voir mes commentaires). Horwich fait cependant beaucoup de commentaires incisifs. J’ai particulièrement aimé son résumé de l’importation de la position anti-théorique de W sur p65. Il doit mettre davantage l’accent sur 'On Certainty', récemment l’objet de beaucoup d’efforts de Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva et d’autres et résumé dans mes récents articles. Horwich est de premier ordre et son travail vaut bien l’effort. On espère qu’il (et tout le monde) étudiera Searle et une certaine psychologie moderne ainsi que Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker et Baker, etc. pour atteindre une large vision moderne du comportement. La plupart de leurs papiers sont sur academia dot edu et philpapers dot org, mais pour PMS Hacker voir http : info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/ scr / hacker / DownloadPapers dot html. Il donne l’un des plus beaux résumés de l’endroit où une compréhension de Wittgenstein nous laisse que j’ai jamais vu. « Il ne doit y avoir aucune tentative d’expliquer notre activité linguistique/conceptuelle (PI 126) comme dans la réduction de l’arithmétique à la logique de Frege ; aucune tentative de lui donner des fondations épistémologiques (PI 124) comme dans les comptes basés sur le sens d’une connaissance a priori; aucune tentative de caractériser des formes idéalisées de celui-ci (PI 130) comme dans le sens logique; aucune tentative de réforme (PI 124, 132) comme dans la théorie de l’erreur de Mackie ou l’intuitionnisme de Dummett; aucune tentative de rationaliser (PI 133) comme dans le récit de Quine de l’existence; aucune tentative pour le rendre plus cohérent (PI 132) comme dans la réponse de Tarski aux paradoxes menteurs; et aucune tentative pour le rendre plus complet (PI 133) comme dans le règlement des questions d’identité personnelle pour des scénarios hypothétiques bizarres de « téléportation ». Enfin, permettez-moi de suggérer qu’avec la perspective que j’ai encouragée ici, W est au centre de la philosophie et de la psychologie contemporaines et n’est pas obscure, difficile ou non pertinente, mais scintillante, profonde et limpide et que de lui manquer est de manquer l’une des plus grandes aventures intellectuelles possibles. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Horwich dà una bella analisi di Wittgenstein (W) ed è uno studioso W leader, ma a mio parere, tutti non sono al di sotto di un pieno apprezzamento, come spiego a lungo in questa recensione e molti altri. Se non si capisce W (e preferibilmente anche Searle) allora non vedo come si possa avere più di una comprensione superficiale della filosofia e del pensiero di ordine superiore e quindi di tutti i comportamenti complessi (psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, storia, letteratura, società). In (...) poche parole, W ha dimostrato che quando hai dimostrato come una frase viene usata nel contesto di interesse, non c'è più nulla da dire. Inizierò con alcune citazioni degne di nota e poi darò quelle che penso siano le considerazioni minime necessarie per capire Wittgenstein, la filosofia e il comportamento umano. La prima si potrebbe notare che mettere "meta" davanti a qualsiasi parola dovrebbe essere sospetto. W ha osservato ad esempio, che la metamatematica è matematica come qualsiasi altra. L'idea che possiamo uscire dalla filosofia (cioè la psicologia descrittiva del pensiero di ordine superiore) è di per sé una profonda confusione. Un'altra irritazione qui (e per tutta la scrittura accademica negli ultimi 4 decenni) è il costante sessismo linguistico inverso di "lei" e "suo" e "lei" o "lui/ lei" ecc., dove "loro" e "loro" e "loro" farebbero bene. Allo stessomodo, l'uso della parola francese "repertorio" in cui l'inglese "repertorio" farà abbastanza bene. La carenza principale è il fallimento completo (anche se molto comune) di impiegare quello che vedo come la vista di due sistemi estremamente potente e intuitiva del quadro di HOT e Searle che ho delineato sopra. Questo è particolarmente toccante nel capitolo sul significato p111 et seq. (soprattutto nelle note a piè di pagina 2-7), dove nuotiamo in acqua molto fangosa senza la struttura di vero automatizzato solo S1, proposizionale disposizionale S2, COS ecc. Si può anche ottenere una migliore vista dell'interno e dell'esterno leggendo ad esempio, Johnston o Budd (vedi le mie recensioni). Horwich però fa molti commenti incisivi. Mi è piaciuto soprattutto il suo riassunto dell'importazione della posizione anti-teorica di W su p65. Ha bisogno di dare più enfasi a 'On Certainty', recentemente oggetto di grande sforzo di Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva e altri e riassunto nei miei recenti articoli. Horwich è di prim'ordine e il suo lavoro vale la pena. Si spera che lui (e tutti) studierà Searle e un po 'di psicologia moderna così come Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker e Baker ecc per raggiungere una vasta visione moderna del comportamento. La maggior parte dei loro documenti sono su academia dot edu e philpapers dot org etc. Egli dà uno dei più bei riassunti di dove una comprensione di Wittgenstein ci lascia che io abbia mai visto. "Non ci deve essere alcun tentativo di spiegare la nostra attività linguistico/concettuale (PI 126) come nella riduzione dell'aritmetica di Frege alla logica; nessun tentativo di dargli basi epistemologiche (PI 124) come nei resoconti basati sul significato di una conoscenza a priori; nessun tentativo di caratterizzarne le forme idealizzate (PI 130) come nelle logiche del senso; nessun tentativo di riformarlo (PI 124, 132) come nella teoria degli errori di Mackie o nell'intuizione di Dummett; nessun tentativo di snellirla (PI 133) come nel racconto dell'esistenza di Quine; nessun tentativo di renderlo più coerente (PI 132) come nella risposta di Tarski ai paradossi bugiar; e nessun tentativo di renderlo più completo (PI 133) come nel sistemare le questioni di identità personale per bizzarri scenari ipotetici di 'teletrasporto'." Infine, lasciatemi suggerire che con la prospettiva che ho incoraggiato qui, W è al centro della filosofia contemporanea e della psicologia e non è oscura, difficile o irrilevante, ma scintillante, profonda e cristallina e che permane lo è mancare una delle più grandi avventure intellettualipossibili. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Este libro es invaluable como sinopsis de algunos de los trabajos de uno de los más grandes filósofos de los últimos tiempos. Hay mucho valor en el análisis de sus respuestas a las confusiones básicas de la filosofía, y en los intentos generalmente excelentes de conectar el pensamiento chino clásico con la filosofía moderna. Tomo una visión moderna de Wittgensteiniano para colocarla en perspectiva. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos (...) sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2ª ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía, Historia y Literatura (2019), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky(2019) y otros. Este libro es un intento único de correlacionar la filosofía clásica china con la de Searle (S), a quien considero como el mejor desde Wittgenstein (W) y su heredero intelectual. La calidad de los artículos es inusualmente alta para una colección de este tipo, que debe deberse a la cuidadosa selección de papeles de Mou. A los lectores les resultará instructivo comparar esto con otro volumen reciente de artículos sobre la filosofía de S, "Pensando en el mundo real", otro libro en el que he escrito la única reseña. Al igual que con W, todo lo que S escribe es un tesoro, pero lamentablemente este tome ha atraído tan poca atención que esta parece ser la única revisión, a pesar de que apareció hace 6 años. Su única deficiencia real es la falta de impresión de la respuesta de S a Allinson, ya que corregiría sus numerosos errores sustanciales. Como se señaló en mis otras críticas, tales errores son de interés ya que son los impagos universales de nuestra psicología debido al hecho de que nuestro lenguaje carece de perspicuidad, como W señaló por primera vez en el BBB (Blue and Brown Books) hace 3/4 de un siglo. Cuando se grabó la conferencia, traté de obtener el video o una transcripción de la respuesta de S de Mou, S, Allinson y 3 personas en HKUST, pero nadie ayudaría. La cuestión de la espiritualidad se mezcla inevitablemente con las cuestiones del lenguaje de la filosofía en algunos de los artículos aquí. Las muchas sutilezas en el camino para disipar la ilusión del ego y la consecución de la iluminación son otra cuestión entera, aunque como en todas las demás arenas, inevitablemente surgen confusiones filosóficas cuando se habla de religión, en lugar de practicarla. Es decir, la filosofía en el sentido amplio, como la reflexiona sobre la ética, la religión, la moralidad, cómo debemos vivir o sentir nos acerca de nuestra vida y el mundo no es el sentido más estrecho en el que W y S lo están practicando, aunque inevitablemente y casi universalmente el sentido amplio se mezcla con i acerca de cómo funciona el lenguaje (la mente como W nos mostró). Como siempre, lo primero que hay que tener en cuenta es el dictum de W de que no hay nuevos descubrimientos que hacer en filosofía ni explicaciones que dar, sino sólo descripciones claras del comportamiento (lenguaje). Una vez que uno entiende que todos los problemas son confusiones sobre cómo funciona el lenguaje, estamos en paz y la filosofía en su sentido ha logrado su propósito. Como W/S ha señalado, sólo hay una realidad, por lo que en el sentido estrecho, no hay múltiples versiones de la mente o la vida o el mundo que se pueden dar significativamente, y sólo podemos comunicarnos en nuestro lenguaje público único. Mostró famosamente que no puede haber un lenguaje privado y que cualquier pensamiento "privado interno" no puede ser comunicado y no puede tener ningún papel en nuestra vida social. También debería ser muy sencillo resolver problemas filosóficos en este sentido. "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros". Wittgenstein" El Libro Azul" p6(1933). (shrink)

Horwich dá uma boa análise de Wittgenstein (W) e é um estudioso w líder, mas na minha opinião, todos eles estão aquém de uma apreciação plena, como eu explicar em comprimento nesta revisão e muitos outros. Se um não compreende W (e preferivelmente Searle também) então eu não ver como um poderia ter mais do que uma compreensão superficial da filosofia e do pensamento mais elevado da ordem e assim de todo o comportamento complexo (psychologia, sociologia, antropologia, história, literatura, sociedade (...) civil). Em poucas palavras, W demonstrou que quando você tem mostrado como uma sentença é usada no contexto de interesse, não há nada mais a dizer. Vou começar com algumas citações notáveis e, em seguida, dar o que eu acho que são as considerações mínimas necessárias para entender Wittgenstein, filosofia e comportamento humano. Primeiro pode-se notar que colocar "meta" na frente de qualquer palavra deve ser suspeito. W comentou, por exemplo, que a metamatemática é matemática como qualquer outra. A noção de que podemos pisar fora da filosofia (ou seja, a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) é em si uma profunda confusão. Outra irritação aqui (e ao longo da escrita acadêmica para as últimas 4 décadas) é o sexismo linguístico reverso constante de "ela" e "dela" e "ela" ou "ele/ela", etc, onde "eles" e "deles" e "eles" faria bem. Da mesma forma, o uso da palavra francesa ' repertório ', onde o repertório Inglês ' vai fazer muito bem. A maior deficiência é a falha completa (embora muito comum) para empregar o que eu vejo como a visão de dois sistemas extremamente poderoso e intuitivo de HOT e Searle ' s estructura que eu esboçou aqui. Isto é especialmente comovente no capítulo sobre o significado P111 et seq (especialmente nas notas de rodapé 2-7), onde nadamos em água muito enlameada, sem o quadro de automatizado verdadeiro apenas S1, proposicional mudança de caráter S2, cos etc. Um pode igualmente começ uma vista melhor do interno e do exterior lendo por exemplo, Johnston ou Budd (veja meus comentários). Horwich, no entanto, faz muitos comentários incisivos. Eu gostei especialmente de seu resumo da importação da postura antiteórica de W em p65. Ele precisa dar mais ênfase a "on certeza", recentemente o tema de muito esforço por Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva e outros e resumidos em meus artigos recentes. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

Claramente ni yo ni nadie leeremos nunca ninguna parte sustancial de este enorme tome, así que discutiré el único artículo que más me interese y que creo que proporciona el marco necesario para la comprensión de todos los demás. Me refiero a la de Ludwig Wittgenstein (W). Incluso si yo tratara de discutir otros, no pasaría la primera página, ya que todos los problemas aquí surgen inmediatamente en cualquier discusión de comportamiento. La diferenciación de la pragmática y la semántica no (...) tiene sentido en gran medida. Es defendible que se pueda subtitular esta obra 'Desarrollos del contextualismo de Wittgenstein', pero, por supuesto, este término ha sido inevitablemente corrompido por filósofos. Uno podría decirse entonces que la pragmática y la semántica son partes o coextensivas con la epistemología y la ontología y la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (Estructura lógica de la racionalidad de Searle) o que describen cómo usamos los ruidos en contextos específicos para darles significado --es decir, un uso verdadero o falso (propsicional). La adición del trabajo de Wittgenstein/Searle a la investigación moderna sobre el pensamiento proporciona un marco para la pragmática, la semántica y todos los demás comportamientos humanos. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2ª ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía, Historia y Literatura (2019), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky(2019) y otros. . (shrink)

Este livro é inestimável como uma sinopse de algumas das obras de um dos maiores filósofos dos últimos tempos. Há muito valor em analisar suas respostas às confusões básicas da filosofia, e em tentativas geralmente excelentes de conectar o pensamento clássico chinês com a filosofia moderna. Eu tenho uma visão moderna de Wittgensteiniano para colocá-lo em perspectiva. Aqueles que querem uma estrutura completa até o momento para o comportamento humano do ponto de vista moderno de dois sistemas podem consultar meus (...) livros Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicídio pela Democracia 4a ed (2019), Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019), Entendendo as Conexões Entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia (2019), Delírios Utópicos Suicidas no século XXI (2019), Observações sobre Impossibilidade, Incompletude, Paraconsistência, Indecidabilidade, Alealeitividade, Computabilidade, Informática, Paradoxo e Incerteza em Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, Doria, da Costa , Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock e Yanofsky (2019) e outros. Este livro é uma tentativa única de correlacionar a filosofia clássica chinesa com a de Searle (S), a quem considero ser o melhor desde Wittgenstein (W) e seu herdeiro intelectual. A qualidade dos itens é extraordinariamente alta para tal coleção, que deve ser devido à cuidadosa seleção de papéis de Mou. Os leitores acharão instrutivo comparar isso com outro volume recente de artigos sobre a filosofia de S, "Thinking About the Real World", outro livro no qual escrevi a única revisão. Como em W, tudo o que S escreve é um tesouro, mas infelizmente essa tomada tem atraído tão pouca atenção que esta parece ser a única revisão, mesmo que tenha aparecido há 6 anos. Sua única deficiência real é a falta de impressão da resposta de S a Allinson, pois corrigiria seus inúmeros erros substanciais. Como observado em minhas outras críticas, tais erros são de interesse, pois são os padrões universais de nossa psicologia devido ao fato de que nossa linguagem carece de perspicaz, como W apontou pela primeira vez no BBB (Blue and Brown Books) 3/4 de um século atrás. Quando a conferência foi gravada, tentei obter o vídeo ou uma transcrição da resposta de Mou, S, Allinson e 3 pessoas no HKUST, mas ninguém ajudou. A questão da espiritualidade inevitavelmente se mistura com as questões da linguagem da filosofia em alguns dos artigos aqui. As muitas sutilezas ao longo do caminho para dissipar a ilusão de ego e a realização da iluminação são outra questão inteira, embora como em todas as outras arenas, as confusões filosóficas inevitavelmente surgem quando falam de religião, em vez de praticá-la. Ou seja, a filosofia no sentido geral, pois reflete sobre ética, religião, moralidade, como devemos viver ou sentir sobre nossa vida e o mundo não é o sentido mais estreito em que W e S estão praticando isso , embora inevitavelmente e quase universalmente o sentido amplo é misturado com i sobre como a linguagem funciona (a mente como W nos mostrou). (shrink)

Overall Johnston has done a phenomenal job and this book should be required reading for all those interested in behavior. It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and (...) possibly this preposterous situation will change, especially due to the continuing efforts of Peter Hacker and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein from the modern two systems of thought perspective as W did 60 years ago. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

Antes de comentar en "La nueva ciencia de la mente", primero ofrezco algunos comentarios sobre filosofía y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como se ejemplifica en las obras de Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. Ayudará a ver mis reseñas de PNC (Filosofía en un Nuevo Siglo), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) y otros libros por y sobre estos genios, que proporcionan una descripción clara del comportamiento de orden superior, no se encuentra en (...) psicología ni filosofía, a la que me referiré como el marco de WS. Al igual que con tantos libros de filosofía, podríamos parar con el título. Como indican las citas y comentarios anteriores y en mis otras reseñas y los libros que cubren, hay razones convincentes para los problemas que enfrentamos al describir la psicología del orden superior considerado como conceptual y no científico. Esto debería ser cristalino para todos, pero la envidia de la ciencia y el olvido casi completo a WSH, etc. es un modo la! Pero como H señala anteriormente, los temas discutidos aquí son todo acerca de los juegos de idiomas y no tienen nada que ver con la ciencia. De hecho, como de costumbre, si uno traduce al inglés claro hay muy poco interés aquí, y ciertamente nada no dicho antes y mejor por WS, etc. innumerables veces desde los años 30 (véase, por ejemplo, The Blue and Brown Books de 1933- 35). No es de extrañar que no haga referencias significativas a ninguno de los libros o personas anteriores (¡la única referencia a S es un artículo de 1958!), aunque en mi opinión están en la parte superior de la lista de las principales figuras de la psicología descriptiva. En la p119 nos dice que la clave de todo esto es averiguar cómo "... un proceso cognitivo a nivel personal puede pertenecer a un sujeto representativo. Esta es la tarea de la segunda mitad del libro". Pero W hizo esto hace 80 años y ya que tenemos las explicaciones bellamente claras de WSH, H&M, etc., no tiene sentido torturarse con la prosa bastante sin rumbo y opaca que se desvía terminan en Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl y Frege, con un toque de ensalada de palabras posmodernista para buena medida. Un esfuerzo valiente en un tema interesante, pero en última instancia agotador e infructuoso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2ª ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía, Historia y Literatura (2019), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky(2019) y otros. (shrink)

Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. As expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the description of behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments above, his many examples of how S1 becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, and his attempts to separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points and is aware of the foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too (...) scattered and does not clearly describe W’s analysis of how our innate automatic unconscious S1 is the axiomatic basis for all behavior (but with a few exceptions nobody else to this day has either). Russell’s article is excellent, especially the first part dealing with Kripke’s famously distorted view of W. For a more recent and superb deconstruction of Kripke’s W that is of very general application, see ‘Kripke’s conjuring Trick’ by Read and Sharrock. I also found Coulter’s article quite good, and like Margolis and Harre, he has continued his work to the present day and published widely. Margolis is very bright and well-read but his precious prose and attempt to include as many references as possible results in a lack of clarity and focus. Rosch makes the best effort to apply W to real research but also lacks the broad understanding of him that could transform his view of higher order thought. Harre has since become a major W scholar but has little to say here, so those interested should see my review of his ‘Wittgenstein and Psychology’. Overall, considering that this book was written over 25 years ago, and most of the authors were not philosophers, they did a good job and the volume is still worth reading. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, but in my view they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, (...) W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. -/- First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likwise the use of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the chapter on meaning p111 et seq.(esp. in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import of W’s antitheoretical stance on p65. Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on academia.edu but for PMS Hacker see http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. As expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the description of behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments above, his many examples of how S1becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, and his attempts to separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points and is aware of the foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too scattered (...) and does not clearly describe W’s analysis of how our innate automatic unconscious S1 is the axiomatic basis for all behavior (but with a few exceptions nobody else to this day has either). Russell’s article is excellent, especially the first part dealing with Kripke’s famously distorted view of W. For a more recent and superb deconstruction of Kripke’s W that is of very general application, see “Kripke’s conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock, available on the net. I also found Coulter’s article quite good and like Margolis and Harre, he has continued his work to the present day and published widely. Margolis is very bright and well read but his precious prose and attempt to include as many references as possible results in a lack of clarity and focus. Rosch makes the best effort to apply W to real research but also lacks the broad understanding of him that could transform the view of higher order thought. Harre has since become a major W scholar but has little to say here, so those interested should see my review of his “Wittgenstein and Psychology”. Overall, considering that this book was written over 25 years ago and most of the authors were not philosophers they did a good job and the volume is still worth reading. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

Horwich memberikan analisis baik Wittgenstein (w) dan merupakan sarjana W terkemuka, tetapi dalam pandangan saya, mereka semua jatuh pendek dari apresiasi penuh, seperti yang saya jelaskan di length dalam tinjauan ini dan banyak lainnya. Jika seseorang tidak mengerti W (dan sebaiknya Searle juga) maka saya tidak melihat bagaimana seseorang bisa memiliki lebih dari pemahaman yang dangkal filsafat dan urutan yang lebih tinggi berpikir dan dengan demikian dari semua perilaku kompleks (psikologi, Sosiologi, antropologi, sejarah, sastra, masyarakat). Singkatnya, W menunjukkan bahwa ketika (...) Anda telah menunjukkan bagaimana kalimat digunakan dalam konteks kepentingan, tidak ada lagi yang dapat dikatakan. Saya akan mulai dengan beberapa kutipan penting dan kemudian memberikan apa yang saya pikir adalah pertimbangan minimum yang diperlukan untuk memahami Wittgenstein, filsafat dan perilaku manusia. -/- Pertama mungkin dicatat bahwa menempatkan "meta" di depan kata apapun harus tersangka. W berkomentar misalnya, bahwa metamathematics adalah matematika seperti yang lain. Gagasan bahwa kita dapat melangkah keluar filsafat (yaitu, psikologi deskriptif pemikiran yang lebih tinggi) adalah dirinya sendiri kebingungan yang mendalam. Iritasi lain di sini (dan di seluruh akademik menulis selama 4 dekade terakhir) adalah bahasa yang konstan sebaliknya seksisme dari "dia" dan "miliknya" dan "dia" atau "dia/dia" dll, di mana "mereka" dan "mereka" dan "mereka" akan melakukan dengan baik. Demikian pula, penggunaan kata Perancis ' repertoar ' di mana bahasa Inggris ' Repertory ' akan cukup baik. Kekurangan utama adalah kegagalan lengkap (meskipun sangat umum) untuk mempekerjakan apa yang saya lihat sebagai sangat kuat dan intuitif dua sistem pandangan HOT dan Searle's kerangka yang telah saya diuraikan di atas. Hal ini terutama pedih dalam bab tentang makna p111 et seq. (terutama di catatan kaki 2-7), di mana kita berenang di air yang sangat berlumpur tanpa kerangka benar otomatis hanya S1, disposisional proposisional S2, cos dll Satu juga bisa mendapatkan pandangan yang lebih baik dari dalam dan luar dengan membaca misalnya, Johnston atau Budd (Lihat ulasan saya). Horwich namun membuat banyak komentar tajam. Saya terutama menyukai ringkasan nya dari impor w's anti-teoritis sikap pada P65. Dia perlu memberikan penekanan lebih untuk ' pada kepastian ', baru-baru ini subjek banyak usaha oleh Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva dan lain-lain dan diringkas dalam artikel baru-baru ini. -/- Horwich adalah tingkat pertama dan pekerjaannya layak usaha. Satu harapan bahwa ia (dan semua orang) akan mempelajari Searle dan beberapa psikologi modern serta Hutto, baca, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, berjalan, hacker dan Baker dll untuk mencapai pandangan modern yang luas perilaku. Sebagian besar kertas mereka berada di academia dot edu dan philpapers dot org, tetapi untuk PMS Hacker. -/- Dia memberikan salah satu ringkasan yang paling indah di mana pemahaman Wittgenstein meninggalkan kita yang pernah saya lihat. -/- "Tidak boleh ada upaya untuk menjelaskan linguistik/kegiatan konseptual kita (PI 126) seperti Frege pengurangan aritmatika untuk logika; tidak ada upaya untuk memberikan fondasi epistemologis (PI 124) seperti dalam arti rekening berdasarkan pengetahuan apriori; tidak ada upaya untuk mencirikan bentuk ideal itu (PI 130) seperti dalam pengertian Logics; tidak ada usaha untuk mereformasi (PI 124, 132) seperti teori kesalahan Mackie atau intuisi Dummett; tidak ada upaya untuk merampingkan itu (PI 133) seperti dalam laporan quine keberadaan; tidak ada usaha untuk membuatnya lebih konsisten (PI 132) seperti dalam tanggapan Tarski terhadap paradoks pembohong; dan tidak ada upaya untuk membuatnya lebih lengkap (PI 133) seperti dalam penyelesaian pertanyaan identitas pribadi untuk skenario aneh ' teleportasi '. -/- Akhirnya, izinkan saya menyarankan bahwa dengan perspektif saya telah mendorong di sini, W adalah di pusat filsafat dan psikologi kontemporer dan tidak jelas, sulit atau tidak relevan, tapi gemilang, mendalam dan jernih dan bahwa untuk merindukannya adalah untuk melewatkan salah satu petualangan intelektual terbesar mungkin. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) . (shrink)

The death of Peter Winch in 1997 sparked a revived interest in his work with this book arguing his work suffered misrepresentation in both recent literature and in contemporary critiques of his writing. Debates in philosophy and sociology about foundational questions of social ontology and methodology often claim to have adequately incorporated and moved beyond Winch's concerns. Re-establishing a Winchian voice, the authors examine how such contentions involve a failure to understand central themes in Winch's writings and that the issues (...) which occupied him in his Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy and later papers remain central to social studies. The volume offers a careful reading of the text in alliance with Wittgensteinian insights and alongside a focus on the nature and results of social thought and inquiry. It draws parallels with other movements in the social studies, notably ethnomethodology, to demonstrate how Winch's central claim is both more significant and more difficult to transcend than sociologists and philosophers have hitherto imagined. (shrink)

The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget contends that children below the age of 12 see no necessity for the logical law of non-contradiction. I argue this view is problematic. First of all, Piaget's dialogues with children which are considered supportive of this position are not clearly so. Secondly, Piaget underestimates the necessary nature of following the logical law of non-contradiction in everyday discourse. The mere possibility of saying something significant and informative at all presupposes that the law of non-contradiction is enforced.

Ausgangspunkt ist die Frage, was Masse ist, wodurch sie insbesondere befähigt ist, Dauer zu konstituieren und deshalb - im Sinn des kinematischen Relativitätsprinzips - ebenso als bewegt wie als ruhend betrachtet werden kann. In einem Gedankenexperiment wird diese Frage, in Umkehrung der Perspektive, hier nicht von der Masse selbst, sondern von einer stehenden Lichtwelle her angegangen. In diesem Modell lassen sich masse-analoge Strukturen rekonstruieren, die in relativer Bewegung sein können. Die (empirisch bekannte) Unabhängigkeit der Lichtgeschwindigkeit vom Bezugssystem ist dabei nicht (...) vorausgesetzt. Doch kann gezeigt werden, dass die Lichtgeschwindigkeit Grenzgeschwindigkeit solcher relativer Bewegungen ist, dass dies für alle durch masse-analoge Strukturen konstituierte, relativ zueinander gleichförmig bewegten Bezugssysteme gilt und dass die Lichtgeschwindigkeit selbst in allen diesen Systemen gleich ist. Die Absolutheit der Lichtgeschwindigkeit und die Relativität der Massebewegungen erweisen sich so als zwar differente, aber intrinsisch zusammengehörende Momente des kinematischen Relativitätsprinzips: ein Beitrag zu einer Philosophie der Relativitätstheorie. - Die mathematischen Zusammenhänge werden im Anhang ausführlicher dargelegt. (shrink)

As automating technologies are increasingly integrated into workplaces, one concern is that many of the human workers who remain will be relegated to more dull and less positively impactful work. This paper considers two rival theories of meaningful work that might be used to evaluate particular implementations of automation. The first is achievementism, which says that work that culminates in achievements to workers’ credit is especially meaningful; the other is the practice view, which says that work that takes the form (...) of an open-ended practice is especially meaningful. Of the two, the practice view is the better tool for assessing the future of meaningful work, because achievementism is explanatorily inadequate in two ways. Moreover, the practice view can explain why the most meaningful forms of work cannot be automated. A procedure can only be automated as long as the steps are defined, whereas, in such work, which steps to take is indefinitely open to redefinition. This reveals the real threat to meaningful work to be a political-economic one. The relevant ethical questions there have to do with how much creative control workers retain in crafting their own jobs, when those jobs involve meaningful work in collaboration with machines; and how to liberate workers from jobs that do not involve meaningful work, which should be left to machines anyway. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

Stephen Yablo’s notion of proportionality, despite controversies surrounding it, has played a significant role in philosophical discussions of mental causation and of high-level causation more generally. In particular, it is invoked in James Woodward’s interventionist account of high-level causation and explanation, and is implicit in a novel approach to constructing variables for causal modeling in the machine learning literature, known as causal feature learning (CFL). In this article, we articulate an account of proportionality inspired by both Yablo’s account of proportionality (...) and the CFL account of variable construction. The resulting account has at least three merits. First, it illuminates an important feature of the notion of proportionality, when it is adapted to a probabilistic and interventionist framework. The feature is that at the center of the notion of proportionality lies the concept of “determinate intervention effects.” Second, it makes manifest a virtue of (common types of) high-level causal/explanatory statements over low-level ones, when relevant intervention effects are determinate. Third, it overcomes a limitation of the CFL framework and thereby also addresses a challenge to interventionist accounts of high-level causation. (shrink)

In this paper, I contest increasingly common "realist" interpretations of Hegel's theory of "the concept" (der Begriff), offering instead a "isomorphic" conception of the relation of concepts and the world. The isomorphism recommended, however, is metaphysically deflationary, for I show how Hegel's conception of conceptual form creates a conceptually internal standard for the adequacy of concepts. No "sideways-on" theory of the concept-world relationship is envisioned. This standard of conceptual adequacy is also "graduated" in that it allows for a lack of (...) fit between concept and world. The possibility for a "maximally isomorphic" fit between concept and world obtains through the teleological realization of concepts, which marks especially the "artificial" world of human culture (law, art, religion, etc.). Some of the most seemingly exaggerated claims Hegel makes about the concept, I contend, can be understood when we consider the significance Hegel ascribes to human making, which is provided for in his conceptual theory. But my framework provides an interpretive key for the way Hegel sees concepts imperfectly realized in the natural world as well. (shrink)

In this essay I suggest that we view design principles in systems biology as minimal models, for a design principle usually exhibits universal behaviors that are common to a whole range of heterogeneous (living and nonliving) systems with different underlying mechanisms. A well-known design principle in systems biology, integral feedback control, is discussed, showing that it satisfies all the conditions for a model to be a minimal model. This approach has significant philosophical implications: it not only accounts for how design (...) principles explain, but also helps clarify one dispute over design principles, e.g., whether design principles provide mechanistic explanations or a distinct kind of explanations called design explanations. (shrink)

Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...

It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb, which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. Expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is P (...) ‘in its own right’ or without some further ‘condition’. Accordingly, “an sich selbst” should not be treated as forming complex nouns. This analysis has significant consequences for the interpretation of “thing in itself” in particular, for it implies that the latter is not a complete nominal expression. Instead, one must treat ‘an sich selbst’ as expressing how some S is a ‘thing’, looking to the wider sentential context. I conclude with a brief account of the new significance granted to the concept of a ‘thing’ (Ding) according to the present interpretation. (shrink)

Nudging works through dispositions to decide with specific heuristics, and has three component parts. A nudge is a feature of an environment that enables such a disposition; a person is nudged when such a disposition is triggered; and a person performs a nudged action when such a disposition manifests in action. This analysis clarifies an autonomy-based worry about nudging as used in public policy or for private profit: that a person’s ability to reason well is undermined when she is nudged. (...) Reasoning well is a component of self-guidance, which is an aspect of autonomy and so something there is reason to promote, preserve, or respect. However, a person can reason well when she is nudged: Many of these heuristics are good rules to reason with, and she can be flexible with respect to them when she takes there to be a better way to reason. Along the way, this paper uncovers several design specifications for responsible nudging, and discusses open empirical questions. However, nudging’s being compatible with reasoning well crystallizes a distinct worry about manipulation: that nudge designers can rely on nudged people guiding themselves toward the designers’ own ends. Manipulation of this sort exploits one aspect of autonomy (namely, self-guidance) to undermine autonomy in other respects. (shrink)

This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled out (...) with the translator's critical Introduction, "The esoteric Quine?" a bibliography based on Quine's sources, and an Index for the volume. (shrink)

Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic is so different from a standard logic, most commentators have not treated the portion of that work devoted to logical forms as relevant to this claim. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view that the metaphysical concepts (...) discussed in Books I and II of the Science of Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in Book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction," according to which the categories can be derived from the table of judgments. Though Hegel's metaphysics is often supposed to be influenced by Kant, prevailing interpretations do not show how Hegel's fine-grained treatment of logical forms is relevant to his critical view of metaphysics. The present interpretation provides a model for Hegel's explanation of metaphysical concepts, as well as a new picture of the structure of his Science of Logic that emphasizes the priority of its Doctrine of the Concept. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 1026-1038, December 2021.

Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus (Political-Philosophical Treatise) of W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz proposes a new idea-system. Ideas concerning different topics related to politics are introduced. The work aims to establish the principles of good governance and of a happy society, and to open up new directions for the future development of humankind. It is also in part a critique of the epistemology of early Wittgenstein as presented in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It argues that one can speak about politics and ethics with sense, and that (...) political philosophy is still a viable enterprise for us. This explanation is provided in response to the review of Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus by Katarzyna Heremska and a critical note of Pawel Kloczowski that were both published in Argument 6(1), 2016. (shrink)

ArgumentIn the United States, scientific knowledge is brought before the courts by way of testimony – the testimony of scientific experts. We argue that this expertise is best understoodfirstas related to the quality of the underlying scienceand thenin terms of who delivers it. Bloodstain pattern analysis (BPA), a contemporary forensic science, serves as the vaulting point for our exploration of objectivity as a metric for the quality of a science in judicial contexts. We argue that BPA fails to meet the (...) minimal standard set by Helen Longino’s social-procedural account of objectivity (1990, 2002). In light of some pressing issues for social-procedural accounts, we offer an infrastructural account of objectivity. This account offers what amounts to a friendly amendment to Longino’s account and adds to the ways in which we might analyze social-procedural objectivity. Finally, we address an issue that is pressing in the legal context: given that scientific knowledge is delivered by individuals, not communities, at least in U.S. courts, we (may) need a way to evaluate individual scientific and epistemic agents. We suggest a means for making this evaluation that is derived from our infrastructural account of objectivity. (shrink)

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social (...) ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

This essay defends a reading of Hegel as a metametaphysical antirealist. Metametaphysical antirealism is a denial that metaphysics has as its subject matter answers to theoretical questions about the mind-independent world. Hence, on this view, metaphysical questions are not, in principle, knowledge transcendent. I hold that Hegel presents a version of metametaphysical antirealism in the Science of Logic because he pursues his project by suspending reference to all supposed objects of metaphysical theory as practiced before him. Hegel introduces reference in (...) his theory only by the self-reference of thought to itself in the Doctrine of the Concept. I motivate the relevance of Hegel’s approach to metaphysics by comparing it to Kit Fine’s (2017) concept of “naïve metaphysics.” I argue that Hegel’s theory results from a comprehensively naïve metaphysics. (shrink)

Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenal” properties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpain.

Pada musim semi, entah kenapa, tidak banyak ikan. Karena tangkapannya sangat tidak stabil, Pekakak mulai berpikir. Lalu membuat beberapa rencana. Dengan otoritas komandonya, dia memanggil Bangau: – Ini adalah musim penangkapan ikan yang sangat sulit. Jika kita ingin kenyang, kita harus membuat usaha patungan. Bangau mengangguk, menambahkan: - Saya setuju; mari kita beternak ikan kakap putih dan ikan mas krusia. Jenis ini berumur panjang dan sangat produktif. Pekakak dan Bangau sepakat untuk berbagi tugas beternak, dan tidak ada diskriminasi yang diizinkan. (...) Namun imbalannya berbeda: Pekakak bertanggung jawab untuk ikan kakap putih dan, dengan demikian, dapat memiliki lebih banyak ikan kakap putih, sedangkan Bangau mendapat ikan mas krusia. Siapapun yang memelihara ikan mana yang lebih banyak akan menikmati 80% dari panen akhir ikan tersebut. Keduanya akan mengevaluasi dan membagi produk ternak pada akhir musim beternak. Ini berarti mengantongi sendiri ikan hasil usaha patungan untuk diri sendiri itu dilarang. (shrink)

The current study is a pilot trial to examine the effects of a nonelective, classroom-based, teacher-implemented, mindfulness meditation intervention on standard clinical measures of mental health and affect in middle school children. A total of 101 healthy sixth-grade students (55 boys, 46 girls) were randomized to either an Asian history course with daily mindfulness meditation practice (intervention group) or an African history course with a matched experiential activity (active control group). Self-reported measures included the Youth Self Report (YSR), a modified (...) Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, and the Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Measure –Revised. Both groups decreased significantly on clinical syndrome subscales and affect but did not differ in the extent of their improvements. Meditators were significantly less likely to develop suicidal ideation or thoughts of self-harm than controls. These results suggest that mindfulness training may yield both unique and non-specific benefits that are shared by other novel activities. (shrink)

Suatu pagi di musim panas, desa burung diselimuti keheningan. Semua orang sibuk mendengarkan pengembara baru. Burung pengembara ini berasal dari keluarga yang tidak jelas; bulunya berwarna-warni, gerak-geriknya lucu, dan ilmunya baru. Dia bercerita seolah-olah sedang memberi ceramah, tepat sekali, warga desa memanggilnya burung Guru – orang yang menjawab setiap pertanyaan aneh warga desa yang rajin belajar. Burung pelatuk telah belajar menangkap cacing di sore hari, sehingga mereka tidak perlu bangun pagi. Burung pipit sekarang tahu cara mencuri beras dari gudang saat (...) sawah mulai kering. Bulbul, sementara itu, telah mengambil kesempatan berkumpul untuk memamerkan kecantikan dan fashion mereka… . (shrink)

In recent years, academics and educators have begun to use software mapping tools for a number of education-related purposes. Typically, the tools are used to help impart critical and analytical skills to students, to enable students to see relationships between concepts, and also as a method of assessment. The common feature of all these tools is the use of diagrammatic relationships of various kinds in preference to written or verbal descriptions. Pictures and structured diagrams are thought to be more comprehensible (...) than just words, and a clearer way to illustrate understanding of complex topics. Variants of these tools are available under different names: “concept mapping”, “mind mapping” and “argument mapping”. Sometimes these terms are used synonymously. However, as this paper will demonstrate, there are clear differences in each of these mapping tools. This paper offers an outline of the various types of tool available and their advantages and disadvantages. It argues that the choice of mapping tool largely depends on the purpose or aim for which the tool is used and that the tools may well be converging to offer educators as yet unrealised and potentially complementary functions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe close connection often cited between Hegel and Wilfrid Sellars is not only said to lie in their common negative challenges to the ‘framework of givenness,’ but also in the positive less...

Algebraic structures on linguistic sets associated with a linguistic variable are introduced. The linguistics with single closed binary operations are only semigroups and monoids. We describe the new notion of linguistic semirings, linguistic semifields, linguistic semivector spaces and linguistic semilinear algebras defined over linguistic semifields. We also define algebraic structures on linguistic subsets of a linguistic set associated with a linguistic variable. We define the notion of linguistic subset semigroups, linguistic subset monoids and their respective substructures. We also define as (...) in case of deals in classical semigroups, linguistic ideals in linguistic semigroups and linguistic monoids. This concept of linguistic ideals is extended to the case of linguistic subset semigroups and linguistic subset monoids. We also define linguistic substructures. (shrink)

This book extends the concept of linguistic coordinate geometry using linguistic planes or semi-linguistic planes. In the case of coordinate planes, we are always guaranteed of the distance between any two points in that plane. However, in the case of linguistic and semi-linguistic planes, we can not always determine the linguistic distance between any two points. This is the first limitation of linguistic planes and semi-linguistic planes.

In this book, authors, for the first time, introduce the new notion of special subset linguistic topological spaces using linguistic square matrices. This book is organized into three chapters. Chapter One supplies the reader with the concept of ling set, ling variable, ling continuum, etc. Specific basic linguistic algebraic structures, like linguistic semigroup linguistic monoid, are introduced. Also, algebraic structures to linguistic square matrices are defined and described with examples. For the first time, non-commutative linguistic topological spaces are introduced. The (...) notion of a linguistic special subset of doubly non-commutative topological spaces of linguistic topological spaces is introduced in this book. (shrink)

Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibility of an agent’s maxim: maxims which pass the test are morally neutral, and so permissible, while those which do not are morally impermissible. In contrast, I argue that the FUL tests whether a maxim is the cause or determining ground of an action at all. According to Kant’s general account of causality, nothing can be a cause of some effect unless there is a law-like (...) relation between the putative cause and effect. Applied to the case of action, no maxim can be the cause of an agent’s action unless there is a law-like relation between maxims of that kind and actions of that kind. The special capacity to act according to maxims as law-like causes is what Kant calls a will; the basic constitutive principle of the will is a non-normative principle I call the categorical declarative. While the actions of a perfectly good will would be described by the categorical declarative alone, human action is determined not only by the causality of the will, but also by competing causes, namely those stemming from inclination. There is thus need for a causal test for putative maxims. The test contained in the FUL is meant to determine whether an action could be grounded solely on the agent’s maxim, or whether it requires a cause external to the will. This account permits one to build eventual distinctions concerning the morality of actions on prior and independent distinctions concerning their causality. (shrink)

In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant.

In this essay I propose that what design principles in systems biology and systems neuroscience do is to present abstract characterizations of mechanisms, and thereby facilitate mechanistic explanation. To show this, one design principle in systems neuroscience, i.e., the multilayer perceptron, is examined. However, Braillard (2010) contends that design principles provide a sort of non-mechanistic explanation due to two related reasons: they are very general and describe non-causal dependence relationships. In response to this, I argue that, on the one hand, (...) all mechanisms are more or less general (or abstract), and on the other, many (if not all) design principles are causal systems. (shrink)